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COURTNEY LAUREN ANDERSON
The creation and annexation of cities is an intentional act of politicians 
that can form man-made enclaves comprised of homogenous 
socioeconomic groups. Concentrating resources concentrates power, 
resulting in a trajectory to upward mobility that is steeper for some than 
others. While localism is touted as a government theory that gives the 
power to the people in order to ensure a tailored living experience, the 
ability of a city to draw its own boundaries to ensure that the 
beneficiaries of the tax base are those in power strips power from 
marginalized populations that live outside of these artificial barriers. A
reverberating effect of local statutes that permit cities to be created with 
ease and with minimal oversight is the public health crisis that often 
results from a lack of public service, strained police/community 
relations, and a dearth of optimal public education and employment 
opportunities. This Article examines the theories and processes cities 
adhere to when constructing laws that govern the annexation and 
creation of cities, and examines the public health implications of such 
processes and theories. Despite critiques of a purely localist approach, 
this Article recognizes solutions at the federal level are quickly 
diminishing. 
Although the conclusion sets forth a state-level compromise, the danger 
of this approach is also explored given recent public health 
emergencies that have resulted in cities, such as Flint, Michigan, due to 
state power. The problem has no simple solution, however. The refusal 
of municipalities to acknowledge that there is a problem with 
socioeconomic and racial segregation through seemingly objective city 
planning methods is the central issue that should, at a minimum, be 
acknowledged by those elected to represent their constituents.
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I. INTRODUCTION
In Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, Matthew Parlow defines localism as, “a
descriptive and normative theory of a system of decentralized, independent local 
governments that fosters self-interest and unilateral decision making.”1 Parlow
outlines the main arguments in favor of localism: efficiency, innovation, 
democratic process, and political incentive.2
[T]he ability of consumer-voters to “vote with their feet” and leave one locality 
that fails to meet their needs and interests for another . . . creates an efficient 
local government market place . . . . Citizens can freely choose where to live 
or relocate and can thus “shop” for the local government that best meets their 
needs, interests, and desires.3
The localist perspective on the “consumer-voter” marketplace ignores 
populations who cannot “vote with their feet” due to a lack of economic mobility 
to “freely choose where to live.” This reality becomes especially apparent in 
times of crisis. 
The consequences of legal localism on immobile populations are 
demonstrated clearly in the context of Hurricane Katrina. David Troutt 
examines de facto segregation in New Orleans, and the consequences of white 
flight and sprawl from the city. White citizens of New Orleans, between 1950 
and 2000, relocated to neighboring parishes in massive proportions.4 Troutt 
points to Jefferson Parish as the primary destination for most of the migrating 
white population: “By 2000, a majority of the metropolitan population lived 
outside New Orleans; Jefferson Parish’s population was nearly equal to the city, 
and . . . sprawl offered newer homes and shorter commutes on (usually) higher 
ground.”5 Wealthy, white suburban populations strategically utilized “race-
neutral” zoning ordinances to exclude lower-income residents from infiltrating 
their municipal boundaries, effectively maintaining racial segregation between 
                                                                                                                     
1 Matthew J. Parlow, Equitable Fiscal Regionalism, 85 TEMP. L. REV. 49, 49 (2012).
2 Id. at 55.
3 Id. (footnotes omitted).
4 David D. Troutt, Katrina’s Window: Localism, Resegregation, and Equitable 
Regionalism, 55 BUFF. L. REV. 1109, 1129 (2008).
5 Id. at 1130–31.
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the boundaries of urban and suburban parishes.6 As a result, when Hurricane 
Katrina hit in 2005, almost 80% of Orleans Parish was inundated, and 
“Hurricane Katrina’s force fell disproportionately on the city’s huge population 
of very poor people.”7
Municipal annexation creates and maintains racial and socioeconomic 
segregation, and the devastating effects of a heavy localist approach to 
municipal annexation are illustrated outside of disaster scenarios, such as 
Katrina. This Article will illustrate the public health effects of concentrating 
annexation power at the local level. After focusing on the process of creating 
cities in Missouri and explaining adverse health effects from rampant creation, 
this Article will examine national trends. It is imperative to examine the federal 
government’s agenda in the urban planning landscape to understand how 
disappointment is inevitable for those seeking mitigation of health inequities at 
this level of government. The role of the state remains uncertain, but, 
nevertheless important as a manufactured public health crisis continues to affect 
vulnerable populations. 
II. CREATION OF CITIES IN MISSOURI
The process of city creation in Missouri is quite simple. A number of voters 
equal to 15% of the votes cast in the last gubernatorial election in the area sought 
to be incorporated must come together and petition the county in which their 
proposed city will lie.8 The petition must include a plat of the proposed city, the 
approximate population, the approximate value of all real and personal property 
in the area, and facts proving that the new city will be able to set up its own 
municipal government.9 Once the county is satisfied that the petition meets these 
statutory requirements, the question of incorporation is submitted for a vote of 
the people.10 If a majority of the voters vote for incorporation, then the county 
shall declare the new municipality to be the “city of . . . . . . . . . .” or “town 
of . . . . . . . . . . .”11 The county will then make an order designating the first 
officers of the new municipality, who will hold office until the municipality 
holds its first election.12
Incorporation comes with the advantages of limited autonomy through 
municipal government, revenue generation through taxation, and gaining local 
                                                                                                                     
6 See id. at 1147 (discussing the impact of five Supreme Court cases on the 
solidification of local autonomy over land-use and zoning regulation, and the resulting de 
facto segregation following the end of de jure segregation).
7 Id. at 1142.
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services like a city police department and city utilities.13 However, many may 
not want to be subjected to an added form of taxation and governmental control, 
and thus may oppose incorporation for those reasons.14
III. THE DEMOGRAPHICS OF FERGUSON AND ST. LOUIS COUNTY
At the last census, there were approximately 14,297 black individuals and 
6,206 white individuals living within the City of Ferguson.15 Comparatively, St. 
Louis County reported approximately 233,029 black individuals and 701,948 
white individuals living in the county.16 Currently, there are a staggering ninety-
one municipalities inside St. Louis County.17 The smallest of these 
municipalities had a population of thirteen at the last census.18
In the county’s early history, few incorporations took place. The five 
municipalities that existed after the Civil War developed as railroad travel 
increased, because these cities had trains passing through.19 It was not until after 
World War I ended when the area experienced new suburban growth that the 
number of incorporations took off.20 This growth in incorporations may have 
also been propelled by certain political and racial groups’ need to protect their 
perceived interests in the era of the Civil Rights Movement.21 Over half of St. 
Louis County’s municipalities were incorporated during this time, specifically 
from 1935 to 1957.22 Since the second half of the twentieth century, most 
incorporations in St. Louis have centered around a specific social or economic 
issue. For example, some municipalities incorporated in the 1970’s to avoid 
becoming targets for low-income housing.23 Other municipalities incorporated 
to avoid having their taxes support their poorer neighbors.24
                                                                                                                     
13 Joseph Nicholson, How Does a City Incorporate?, LEGAL BEAGLE,
http://legalbeagle.com/4913925-a-city-incorporate.html [https://perma.cc/PMW3-YHE8].
14 Id. 
15 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, CPH-1-27, MISSOURI: 2010
SUMMARY POPULATION AND HOUSING CHARACTERISTICS 204 (2012), ftp://ftp2.census.gov/
library/publications/2012/dec/cph-1-27.pdf [https://perma.cc/WPG7-VH9N].
16 Id. at 176.
17 Peter Coy, The County Map That Explains Ferguson’s Tragic Discord, BLOOMBERG 
BUSINESSWEEK (Aug. 15, 2014), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-08-
15/how-st-dot-louis-countys-map-explains-fergusons-racial-discord [on file with Ohio State 
Law Journal).
18 Id. 
19 See Sterling Levy, Small, ‘Adorable’ Municipal Governments Abound in St. Louis,







24 Coy, supra note 17.
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The result of this incorporation mania is that many of St. Louis’s
municipalities are now highly divided by race and income.25 The process 
repeated itself in St. Louis many times throughout the twentieth century—as 
more minority groups moved into an area, the white population moved away 
and reincorporated somewhere else, taking its tax base with it.26 The fragmented 
landscape of municipalities in St. Louis also helps explain why Ferguson 
experienced a violent riot after the tragic death of unarmed teenager Michael 
Brown.27 Cities like Ferguson that were robbed of their tax base when the white 
population began to leave and reincorporate elsewhere, are comparatively 
deindustrialized, and as a result, develop inequitably to surrounding cities with 
higher tax bases.28 A person starting a business or new development is 
disincentivized from building it in these poorer cities, because doing so means 
their own city won’t capture the tax revenue from the project.29 As a result, the 
poorer cities offer fewer job opportunities, so residents must travel further to 
find work. In turn, the lack of work also contributes to the overall disparity 
between the higher and lower-tax-based cities.30
This is not to say that St. Louis’s poorer cities like Ferguson have no hope 
of becoming more prosperous. Though it is almost impossible to un-incorporate 
in Missouri, cooperation efforts across the region could work to better disperse 
resources.31
IV. URBAN PLANNING AND HEALTH IN ST. LOUIS COUNTY
St. Louis County’s incorporation past not only sprung out of a contest 
between economic classes, but involves a history of segregation as well.32
Though in 1917 the Supreme Court declared racial zoning ordinances 
unconstitutional, other “backdoor” approaches allowed racially segregating 
practices to continue in St. Louis for decades longer.33 One approach was to 
prohibit housing uses that black people could afford in all-white areas of the 
county.34 In addition, private property owners placed deed restrictions on their 
properties that prohibited the properties from being sold or rented to black 
people.35 Integrated low-income housing was replaced with segregated public 
housing in some areas, and urban renewal projects were undertaken in black 






30 Coy, supra note 17.
31 Id. 
32 Elise C. Boddie, Adaptive Discrimination, 94 N.C. L. REV. 1235, 1270–71 (2016).
33 Id. at 1268.
34 See id. (listing the prohibition multi-family homes as an example of “backdoor”
approaches to racial segregation in St. Louis).
35 Id. 
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neighborhoods where homes were demolished and the residents were forced to 
move somewhere else.36
City planners took it even further, however, and ensured that black 
neighborhoods would be located near undesirable commercial properties such 
as taverns, liquor stores, and brothels.37 In doing so, the planners ensured that 
these residential properties would be ineligible for federally backed mortgages,
making it even harder for black people to own their own homes.38 By 
implication, the Federal Government was investing much more in white 
communities than in black communities.39 This growth prompted private 
investment in the white communities as well, while the black communities 
continued to decline.40 For example, services like trash pickup and emergency 
response were cut in many black communities.41
As a result, St. Louis County’s black population was forced to move to the 
northern part of the county where Ferguson is now located. Northern St. Louis 
County was the only part of the county where discriminatory zoning practices 
were not used, and because discriminatory real estate practices closed off the 
Southern part of the county to black people, many had no choice but to move.42
By this point, the county represented a plethora of small municipalities.43 What 
began as a series of targeted moves to keep the county racially segregated 
culminated in a thick competition for tax revenue: “Originally designed in part 
to perpetuate racial segregation, the patchwork of separate jurisdictions meant 
that small towns and cities were forced to compete for a limited pool of tax 
revenue, leaving fewer fiscal resources for services that were already reduced 
as a result of the relatively small tax base.”44
It is important to expel the myth that “white flight” created the cities as they 
are today in St. Louis County. The scenario is much like that of the “chicken or 
the egg” analogy. Many argue that as black people moved into a neighborhood, 
the white population moved out, taking its tax dollars with them and leaving 
behind the black population that was struggling to get away from the poorer 
schools.45 These scholars argue that discriminatory real estate agents that 
deterred black home buyers from buying in traditionally white neighborhoods, 
in combination with white flight, are what steered St. Louis County’s black 
                                                                                                                     
36 Richard Rothstein, The Making of Ferguson, 24 J. AFFORDABLE HOUSING &
COMMUNITY DEV. L. 165, 166, 193 (2015).
37 Boddie, supra note 32, at 1268–69.
38 Id. at 1269.
39 Id.
40 Id. at 1269–70.
41 Id. at 1270.
42 Id. 
43 Boddie, supra note 32, at 1270–71.
44 Id. (footnotes omitted).
45 Rothstein, supra note 36, at 165.
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population towards the northern part of the county and ultimately created the 
disparity among the cities that we have today.46
In actuality, the government’s racially discriminatory practices contributed
to the decline of black neighborhoods. Discriminatory zoning practices, refusing 
to back mortgages for black homebuyers, federal requirements for exclusory 
property deeds, subsidies for segregated land development, and more ultimately 
lead to overburdened and overpopulated black neighborhoods.47
The white population began to associate black people with these poor 
community characteristics, and moved away from neighborhoods where black 
people moved in to escape the deplorable conditions.48 Thus, rather than white 
flight causing the cities’ decline, the cities’ decline created a misguided fear 
among the white population that black people moving into their neighborhoods 
meant the neighborhood was destined for decay.49
V. CREATION OF CITIES ON A NATIONAL SCALE
St. Louis County, Missouri is not the only place in America where 
municipalities are annexed for political or even racist reasons. In fact, several 
studies have documented these types of annexation patterns across the 
country—from the South all the way to California.
There are many reasons why a municipality may choose to annex.50 From 
the municipality’s side, it entitles it to property taxes, while property owners 
gain access to much needed city services like trash, water, and sewer service.51
A. Annexation Patterns in the South
Though the American South is often considered to be the “heart” of racism 
in the United States, on account of history dating back to the Civil War, one 
study showed that there was little empirical evidence for systematic exclusion 
of black people in annexation decisions, as was previously thought.52 The study 
by Lichter et al. covered the “Old South,” including Georgia, North Carolina, 
South Carolina, Virginia, Alabama, Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas.53 The 
first question that the Lichter et al. study looked at was the racial composition 
                                                                                                                     
46 Id.
47 Id. at 166.
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 See Craig Chamberlain, Illinois Professors Find That Ethnicity Doesn’t Appear to 
Affect Annexation Decisions Like Race Does, ILL. NEWS BUREAU: SOC. SCI. (Sept. 30, 2014, 
9:00 AM), https://news.illinois.edu/blog/view/6367/204510 [https://perma.cc/UP44-KT76].
51 Id.
52 Daniel T. Lichter et al., Municipal Underbounding: Annexation and Racial Exclusion 
in Small Southern Towns, 72 RURAL SOC. 47, 58 (2007).
53 Id. at 51.
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of the areas annexed in the study period of 1990–2000.54 Surprisingly, the 
results showed that the average percent black population in the annexed territory 
of the small towns was 22.4%.55 Additionally, “the percentage black 
[population] was lower in the non-annexed territory than in the annexed territory 
(20.7% vs. 26.6%).”56
However, Lichter et al. are quick to note that their study produced findings 
anomalous to similar studies in the past.57 They offer some possible 
explanations for their findings.58 One possibility may be that rural communities 
dodge annexation if the “fringe” areas, the areas at the edges of the municipality 
or area to be annexed, have a high population of black people.59 They may also 
avoid annexation if they do not have a legal justification for selectively 
incorporating white fringe areas and excluding black fringe areas.60 Although, 
it is to be noted that Lichter et al. also looked at the racial composition of areas 
that did not annex compared with the racial composition of their fringe 
population to see if either of those explanations could be true for the areas 
studied.61 The results showed little evidence of a tendency of white populations 
to resist annexation into majority black areas, at the least.62 The Lichter et al. 
study also compared the racial makeup of fringe areas in annexed versus non-
annexed areas.63 The results showed that the communities that did not annex 
had higher black populations in their fringe areas.64
Lichter et al. additionally explain that though at first glance it seems that 
race is the deciding factor in annexation decisions, there may be other factors at 
play that are “masked” by race.65 For example, economic and political factors.66
The Lichter et al. study posits that communities may only avoid annexation 
when the “threat” posed by the black populations, in the form of economic or 
political motivations, is high.67 As for conclusions drawn from this work, the 
“results are consistent with the conclusion that racial exclusion through 
annexation is perhaps less widespread than it has been portrayed in previous 
studies.”68
                                                                                                                     
54 Id. at 57.
55 Id. 
56 Id. at 58 (emphasis in original).
57 Id. 





63 Id. at 59.
64 Lichter et al., supra note 52, at 59.
65 Id.
66 Id.
67 Id. at 60.
68 Id. at 67.
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B. Annexation Patterns in the American Midwest
Based on perceived race-based annexation patterns in the American South 
(prior to the Lichter et al. study), Professors Wilson and Edwards sought to 
discover if the annexation patterns in the Midwest followed similar patterns.69
The professors posit that the power associated with annexation decisions is “one 
of the more effective devices in the growth management toolbox.”70 Annexation 
may also be used competitively to avoid future annexation by a less desirable 
municipality.71 But not all residents want to be annexed into a municipality. One 
reason may be economic. Property taxes may increase for residents once 
annexed, which is a financial burden, but also contributes to wider access to 
public resources.72 Other objections may include not wanting a local 
government, which are often perceived as corrupt, or not wanting to be subject 
to annoying zoning and property regulations.73
From the municipality’s standpoint, there may be several factors 
contributing to the decision of whether to annex an area. Though revenue growth 
is often thought to be one, it depends on the wealth of the municipality.74
Wealthier annexing jurisdictions usually get higher tax revenues from real 
property, which eliminates revenue growth as a force behind annexation.75
These same wealthier jurisdictions may seek to avoid annexation as a means of 
keeping their community an exclusionary “enclave.”76
The study looked at ten states across the Midwest to determine if the racial 
composition of an area affected its chances at annexation.77 The results of their 
study showed that other demographic factors beyond race played a larger role 
than race or ethnicity did.78 In particular, this study looked at annexation 
patterns in Hispanic populations.79
The demographic factors with the biggest impact on whether a community 
would annex are, first, the ratio of working age adults compared to children and 
senior citizens, and second, the rates of home ownership.80 The age-dependency 
ratio is important as a means of determining how much money a potential 
municipality will be spending on senior services and public schools for 
                                                                                                                     
69 Chamberlain, supra note 50.
70 Bev Wilson & Mary M. Edwards, Annexation and Ethnicity in the American 
Midwest, 50(3) URB. AFF. REV. 417, 423 (2014).
71 Id. 
72 Id. at 424.
73 Id.
74 See id. at 431.
75 Id.
76 Id. 
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children,81 to which not all municipalities want to devote valuable taxpayer 
funds.82
The biggest factors that influenced a particular area’s chances of being 
annexed were population growth in the preceding decade and real estate taxes.83
The professors noted that the positive correlation with real estate taxes runs 
counter to their expectations, but that it may be explained “as an indicator of the 
need to bolster revenue at the jurisdictional level.”84 Another influencing factor 
was the jurisdiction’s “access to an interstate.”85 Read together, the study 
evidenced that socioeconomic factors are likely bigger predictors of annexation 
than ethnicity.86 Overall, the professors concluded “that there is little evidence 
of selective annexation with an ethnic basis in the ten Midwestern states 
considered between 2000 and 2010.”87
C. Comparing Annexation Patterns on the East and West Coasts
Another study of annexation patterns looked at different communities in 
Modesto, California, and three different cities in North Carolina.88 Unlike the 
previously discussed studies, this study also included the concept of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction in its analysis.89 Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, or ETJ, 
is a concept in some states’ property regulations that allows municipalities to 
exercise control over some activities in areas outside their immediate 
jurisdiction.90 The powers that are granted to municipalities through ETJ vary 
state to state; some only allow police protection outside the city limits, but other 
states allow ordinance coverage, zoning, and property acquisition as well.91 In 
North Carolina, where three of the four studied municipalities are located, 
municipalities have the same powers over their ETJ territory as they do over 
their municipality territory.92 Technically, ETJ territories are areas that a 
municipality intends to annex but has not yet annexed. However, the law does 
not require ETJ territory to be annexed within any particular time frame, and it 
may be a tool for municipalities to keep control over less desirable areas without 
                                                                                                                     
81 Id. 
82 See Wilson & Edwards, supra note 70, at 429 (“[H]igh age-dependency ratio may be 
in need of public services or infrastructure, and are also likely to contribute less to the tax 
base . . . .”).
83 Id. at 433–35.
84 Id. at 435.
85 Id. at 438.
86 Id. 
87 Id. at 441.
88 Ben Marsh et al., Institutionalization of Racial Inequality in Local Political 
Geographies, 31 URB. GEOGRAPHY 691, 692, 701 (2010).
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having to annex them.93 Additionally, once an area has been designated as an 
ETJ territory by a municipality, it cannot be annexed by another municipality 
unless the first municipality releases it—another form of control.94
The first municipality studied was Mebane, North Carolina.95 Surrounding 
predominantly white Mebane are several majority black neighborhoods that 
have been present for decades, all with roots dating back to the post-Civil-War 
era.96 Though Mebane has expanded a few times, these communities have never 
been annexed.97 Many of the properties in these neighborhoods suffer from 
failed septic systems which are beyond repair, and as a result the properties are 
almost worthless.98 Most troubling, however, is that the sewer system map 
shows that Mebane has extended its sewer service several times to reach more 
distant areas that it has annexed, while choosing not to extend service into these 
neighborhoods that desperately need it.99
Mebane’s discriminatory policies towards the majority black ETJ 
neighborhoods do not end there, however. A popular, predominantly white golf 
course community in Mebane, known as The Club at Mill Creek, is separated 
by a road from White Level, a historically black neighborhood.100 While Mill 
Creek gets public services from Mebane and sewer access, in White Level 
Mebane has made two acres the minimum lot size and not allowed public service 
access.101 Additionally, Mebane has repeatedly rejected requests from White 
Level for necessary sewer service access.102
In Moore County, North Carolina the predominantly white towns of 
Aberdeen, Pinehurst, and Southern Pines have been actively annexing other 
predominantly white areas while noticeably excluding predominantly black 
areas.103 Two of these excluded neighborhoods are Jackson Hamlet and Monroe 
Town.104 Though within the ETJ of Pinehurst, these two neighborhoods lack 
sewer service and a political voice in the control that is exerted over them by the 
municipality with ETJ power.105 Similarly, Midway is under the control of 
Aberdeen but excluded from public services, and Waynor Road and No-Man’s
Land experience the same troubles under the control of Southern Pines.106
Besides the public health concern of lack of sewer access and the political 
health concern of lack of voting, lack of access to public resources means no 
                                                                                                                     
93 Id. at 696.
94 See Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 696.





100 Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 697–98.
101 Id. at 698.
102 Id. 
103 Id. at 699.
104 Id. 
105 Id. at 699–700.
106 Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 699.
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access to city police services.107 These excluded neighborhoods are provided 
police services by the county sheriff’s department, which means slower 
response times in emergencies.108 Deputies must drive through the 
municipalities and past the city police departments to get to the excluded 
neighborhoods.109 Fortunately, as a result of organized petitioning by the 
residents of the excluded neighborhoods, Southern Pines, Pinehurst, and 
Aberdeen received Community Development Block Grants to facilitate 
connecting the municipality sewer system infrastructure to these 
neighborhoods.110
In Raeford, North Carolina, the case is slightly different. Raeford is actually 
predominantly black, but the white population keeps control of the town through 
political control, annexation, and ETJ powers.111 Nearby Silver City, which is 
also predominantly black, is subject to Raeford’s ETJ control and thus also has 
no political voice.112 Annexing Silver City into Raeford would turn the political 
tide away from an all-white council, a result that is likely disfavored by the 
existing council.113 However, unlike the other cities studied, Raeford did extend 
sewer lines into parts of Silver City without annexing it.114
In Modesto, California, predominantly Hispanic neighborhoods on the 
outskirts are the ones excluded as a result of selective annexation.115 Originally 
established as communities of workers in the farm-packing industry, these 
neighborhoods are shut off from sewer access to nearby Modesto.116 Not only 
is there no current access to the sewers, but in several of the neighborhoods no
connection is possible to the sewer system because of the way it was built in 
avoidance of these neighborhoods.117 Moreover, a new system is not currently 
possible because regulations require a minimum of 20,000 square feet to install 
a new septic system while the average lot size in the excluded neighborhoods is 
around 7,000 square feet.118 The situation outside of Modesto was so bad that 
in 2004 the excluded residents sued Modesto in federal court to try to get 
sidewalks, street lights, sewer access, and public safety services.119
The study served to highlight some issues with ETJ statutes.120 ETJ laws 
may actually encourage selective annexation based on discrimination by way of 




110 Id. at 701.
111 Id. at 702.
112 Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 703.
113 See id. 
114 Id. at 704.
115 Id. at 701.
116 See id. 
117 See id. 
118 Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 701.
119 Id. at 702.
120 Id. at 705.
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economic benefits.121 Inevitably, municipalities will be more likely to annex 
those neighborhoods “with the least need for new investment and the greatest 
return in new tax revenues.”122 Thus, discriminatory selective annexation will 
likely continue as long as municipalities have a choice between annexing 
wealthier neighborhoods and excluding but controlling poorer ones.123 When 
one resides in an ETJ territory, not only are they less likely to have access to 
sewer service and public services, but the value of their homes decline 
significantly as well.124 The ultimate effect of this exclusion is summed up 
perfectly by Marsh et al.: “By excluding these neighborhoods, the local 
governments communicated what is obvious to the residents: they are not equal 
to and are not wanted by the White majority community.”125
VI. DISINVESTMENT FROM THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT
Despite the grim portrayal of health determinants found in urban areas that 
are exacerbated by discriminatory annexation, the previous administration 
prioritized the resurgence of cities as economic centers for growth.126 In 2013, 
the Obama Administration introduced “Promise Zones,” a program that awards 
grants, technical assistance, and tax incentives to impoverished communities127
in an effort to jump start the economic outlook of impoverished urban areas.128
In addition to federal efforts, local governments and private actors are making 
strides to maintain urban resources through revitalization efforts.129 Urban 
revitalization is the result of jobs shifting from the suburbs back to the cities, an 
increased private market revitalization, and a neo-urban population made up of 
young, affluent professionals.130 Largely seen as an enclave of crime and 
poverty, cities are now beginning to attract middle-class families, thus breathing 
                                                                                                                     
121 See id.
122 Id. 
123 See id. at 705 (explaining why cities engage in selective annexation).
124 Marsh et al., supra note 88, at 705–06.
125 Id. at 705.
126 See Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks by the President on Strengthening the 
Economy for the Middle Class (Feb. 15, 2013) in https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-
press-office/2013/02/15/remarks-president-strengthening-economy-middle-class 
[https://perma.cc/734E-E75N] (discussing the importance of revitalizing cities to the 
administration). 
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energy into areas that have been overrun with an array of systematic social and 
environmental handicaps.131
However, the election of Donald Trump has dampened the positivity 
surrounding metropolitan growth. Throughout Donald Trump’s campaign, he 
routinely sought out white, working, middle-class voters—leaving the low-
income, minority populations found in cities on the periphery.132 The Trump 
Administration’s proposed budget reflects the thrust of his campaign rhetoric. 
According to the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities (The Center), the 
President’s 2018 fiscal year budget proposes a $6.2 billion cut to the Department 
of Housing and Urban Development (HUD).133 This is more than a 13% budget 
cut to HUD.134 “More than 75 percent of [HUD’s] budget goes to helping 
families pay their rent.”135 An important sector of the rental assistance program 
is the Housing Choice Vouchers Program that subsidizes payment for a safe and 
healthy home.136 Although the Trump Administration’s proposed budget allots 
$35 billion for HUD’s various rental assistance programs, the budget would cut 
“programs like the Housing Choice Vouchers Program by at least $300 
million.”137 These proposed cuts are already proving problematic. According to 
a new report from the National Low-Income Housing Coalition, the country has 
a shortage of more than seven million affordable homes for low-income 
families, and the private sector is not in a position to address this crisis on its 
own.138
Additionally, the proposed budget “eliminates the HOME, Community 
Development Block Grant (CDBG), and Choice Neighborhoods programs that 
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give flexible aid to poor rural and urban communities.”139 HUD’s website states 
that “the CDBG program works to ensure decent affordable housing, to provide 
services to the most vulnerable in our communities, and to create jobs through 
the expansion and retention of businesses.”140 The elimination of these 
programs further handicaps at-risk urban populations. The Center concludes that 
poor populations will lose in excess of “$4.1 billion of HUD funds needed to 
improve basic infrastructure like streets and water and sewer lines, promote 
economic development, and build or rehabilitate affordable housing.”141
In short, the Trump Administration’s proposed budget cuts could be utterly 
disastrous for the low-income urban populace. The federal cuts to HUD and 
other block grants shift the burden of urban areas to local and state 
governments.142 A city’s preferred way to ensure urban redevelopment and 
allow cities to capitalize on the resources present in their territory is through 
zoning efforts.143 To breathe economic life into dilapidated inner cities, cities 
are almost required to zone parcels of land for commercial use.144 “Moving 
stores to the city is obviously something that cities desire, and it is defensible 
purely on that basis. By increasing the tax base, generating jobs, and attracting 
foot traffic that makes streets safer, bringing in large stores can create obvious 
benefits for a city.”145 Cities have to be careful not to grow in such a way that 
the sudden influx of affluent populations increase property prices, ultimately 
isolating low-income communities.146 One method used by Washington, D.C.,
to combat this potential isolation are mixed-income housing projects which 
“intentionally allocate units to families at different income levels, often in bands 
based on percentages of area median income.”147
VII. CONCLUSION
Revitalizing urban areas is both a delicate and complex task—every 
decision having potential adverse effects for thousands of people.148 Urban 
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planner Sharon Zukin notes, “[T]he right to produce authentic places in both 
senses, historically old and creatively new, offers an alternative to the kind of 
growth that pushes many groups out.”149 The role of the state in pursuing such 
alternatives is critical. Bureaucracy that runs rampant at the local level can be 
rooted in self-interest.150 A positive state model approach, as described by 
Robert Pecorella in Property Rights, State Police Power, and the Takings 
Clause: The Evolution Toward Dysfunctional Land Use Management, adheres 
to Dillon’s Rule.151 Dillon’s Rule prohibits local governments from exercising 
power outside of those granted to them by state officials.152 Even in states such 
as Georgia, where Dillon’s Rule is actively applied, the state becomes less 
involved in the area of annexation.153
Dillon’s Rule has been applied to municipal powers throughout Georgia’s
judicial history.154 Original incorporation of municipalities is governed by Title 
36, Chapter 31 of the Georgia Code; subsections 2 through 5 articulate the 
procedural and structural requirements for incorporation, even including 
mandates for minimal requisite municipal activity for maintaining 
municipality.155 However, with regard to annexation authority, the state has 
become less involved in municipal affairs. As is observed by the Georgia Court 
of Appeals in City of Brookhaven v. City of Chamblee, following the amendment 
of the Georgia Constitution in 1954 under which the General Assembly was first 
allowed to delegate its authority to municipalities, legislation was passed which 
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provided three methods through which municipalities were granted authority to 
annex contiguous land.156
(1) The “100% method,” by which a municipality may annex adjoining 
land upon application by all the owners of the land . . . (2) the “60% 
method,” by which a municipality may annex adjoining land upon 
application by a minimum of 60% of adjoining land owners . . . and (3) 
the “Resolution and Referendum method,” by which a municipality 
may, on its own initiative, annex contiguous lands meeting certain
requirements, by resolution and referendum . . . .157
If we learn anything from the state takeover of the city of Flint, Michigan, 
it is that a complete usurpation of local control does not promise positive change, 
particularly with respect to government policies that adversely affect the health 
of minority communities.158 However, an objective approach to annexation 
from a higher level than that of a municipality can provide context and standard 
for creation that will not exclude vulnerable populations from public services 
and resources.
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